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rate" results in an hourly rate less than the minimum, the statutory'
rate is the "regular rate," for the purposes of computation of overtime payments. Carleton Screw Products Co. v. Fleming, supra.
But the "regular rate" for overtime compensation under the FLSA
is not an arbitrary figure, being rather the actual amount determined by dividing all payments, except true overtime premiums,
received by an individual employee as compensation for work
performed, by the number of hours worked by the employee during
the work week; the "regular rate" may vary from week to week.
Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, supra; Landreth v. Ford Bacon
& Davis Co., 147 F.2d 446 (C. C. A. 8th 1945). The FLSA imposes upon the employer an absolute duty to pay currently each
of its employees, within the coverage of the Act, for overtime at a
rate not less than one and one-half times the "regular rate." Bay
Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, supra.
From the above, the conclusion can be drawn that for the purposes of computing overtime pay: (1) Each employee covered by
the Act has a "regular rate" of pay. (2) The "regular rate" is not
the equivalent of the statutory minimum. (3) It is immaterial
that the total wages exceed the statutory minimum. (4) Anything
of value received by the employee for his labors, including tips,
iscreditable as wages. (5) The "regular rate" is determined by
dividing the total wages received during the work week (excluding true overtime payments) by the number of hours worked.
(6) Employees covered by the Act are entitled to overtime pay at
one and one-half times the "regular rate." In the instant case,
if these shoe-shine boys are considered "employees" and covered
by the FLSA, it would seem that their "regular rate" should be
computed by dividing their total wages for the week (all amounts
received from tips and for shining shoes) by the total hours worked
during the week, and that they would be entitled to overtime pay
at one and one-half times the "regular rate" thus calculated.
R. L. T.

TAXATION -

GROSS INCOME -

CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS

AS CONSTITUTING TAxABLE INCOME. -

Taypayer, a natural person,

issued secured bonds evidencing his personal indebtedness to the
holders thereof. After procuring an extension of the maturity
date he, solvent though in "straitened financial circumstances,"
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repurchased the bonds from the holders, either directly or through
a broker and bondholder's committee, at a discount before the
extended maturity date. The Circuit Court of Appeals, treating
the entire transaction as a direct one rather than an open market
one, found that the discount did not represent a taxable gain since
the sellers knew the bonds were being bought by or for the taxpayer. Held, the discount is a taxable gain under INT. REV. CODE
§22 (a), which provides that "Gross income includes . . . gains
and profits and income derived from any source whatever." Judgment reversed. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 69 Sup. Ct. 358 (U. S.
1949).
In 1931, the Supreme Court held that a solvent corporation
realized a taxable gain under Section 22 (a) where it purchased
its own bonds in the open market at a discount, on the theory that
the diminution of liabilities had resulted in a freeing of the assets
previously offset by the obligation of those bonds. United States
v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1 (1931). This ruling has been
generally followed with three notable exceptions: (1) Where the
debt cancellation constitutes a reduction in the contract price
after a sale, this is considered a readjustment of the contract and
no income is realized. Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68
(C. C. A. 6th 1943); Helvering v. A. L. Kilian Co., 128 F.2d 438
(C. C. A. 8th 1942); Hirsch v. Co'nmissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (C. C.
A. 7th 1940). But see 5th Ave. 14th St. Corp. v. Commissioner,
147 F.2d 453, 456 (C. C. A. 2d 1945). (2) Where a corporation's
debt to its shareholder is cancelled, this is considered a contribution to the capital of the corporation rather than income. CarrollMcCreary Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 303 (C. C. A. 2d 1941);
Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Co., 74 F.2d 226 (C. C.
A. 2d 1934). (3) Where the taxpayer is insolvent, taxable income
is realized only to the extent that the debt cancellation makes the
taxpayer solvent. Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 285 (C.
C. A. 5th 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 622 (1941); Lakeland Gro.
cery Co., 36 B. T. A. 289 (1937). In 1943, the Supreme Court
further infringed on the doctrine of the Kirby Lumber case by
holding that a solvent corporation was not taxable for the amount
of accrued rent and interest cancelled by its creditors, on the theory
that such a cancellation constituted a gratuitous forgiveness of
the debt regardless of whether the intent with which it was released was donative or business in nature, and was therefore a gift
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within the meaning of INT. REV. CODE §22 (b) (3), which provides
that "the value of property acquired by gift, devise, or inheritance"
is to be exempt from taxation under Section 22(a). Helvering
v. American Dental Co., 318 U. S. 322 (1943).
The cases following the American Dental case had distinguished it from the Kirby Lumber case on one of two major grounds.
First, the Kirby Lumber case is applicable where the transaction
is an "open market" one rather than a direct transaction between
debtor and creditor as in the American Dental case. Central Paper
Co. v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 131 (C. C. A. 6th 1946); 5th Ave.
14th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 453 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).
Second, the Kirby Lumber case is applicable where there is an adequate consideration for the cancellation rather than a gratuitous
forgiveness as in the American Dental case. Chenango Textile
Corp. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 296 (C. C. A. 1st 1945). The
Court in the Jacobson case pays heed to neither of these distinctions. Instead, it simply states that there was nothing to indicate
that the seller was not getting all that he could for all that he had,
with the result that the Court would not consider the cancellation
a gift under Section 22 (b) (3), whereas the American Dental case
had pointed out that intent or motive was immaterial. so long as the
forgiveness was gratuitous.
The Court in the Jacobson case finds further strength for its
position by pointing out that INT. REv. CODE §22 (b) (9), as enacted in 1939 and amended in 1942, provides that, in the case of
corporations, the amount of income attributable to the discharge
of secured indebtedness is exempt from income tax if there is compliance with section 113 (b) (3), which requires that the amount
so excluded shall be applied to reduce the basis of corporate property. The Court reasons that if such cancellations were already
gifts within Section 22 (b) (3), there would have been no need for
Section 22 (b) (9), and therefore Congress must have considered
that prior to its enactment of Section 22 (b) (9) such cancellations
were subject to taxation under Section 22 (a). And further, since
Section 22 (b) (9) is applicable only to corporations, individual
taxpayers must necessarily have been excluded, and are therefore
subject to Section 22 (a).
Thus, it would seem that the Supreme Court has reaffirmed
the principle of the Kirby Lumber case at the expense of its ruling
in the American Dental case. It is quite possible that the only
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exceptions that will now be recognized to the Kirby Lumber ruling,
in addition to the three enumerated above, are those made in favor
of corporations by Section 22 (b) (9), those where the cancellation
is made with a true donative intent, and those where the creditor's
release is made because of his interest in the business as a going
concern, as in the American Dental case, as distinguished from
an arm's-length transaction in which the creditor's only interest
is to exact from the debtor the best pice available, as in the
Jacobson case.
J. T. C., Jr.
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